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by means of the retention of the Island, might be of special value in bringing about eventually, the fleet action, which the enemy would otherwise probably wish to avoid. It would also make the recapture of the Mainland a possible operation, and favourably affect the whole strategical situation.
Although the defence of the Island of Hongkong would be a very difficult task, it is one which appears to be far more nearly within the powers of the forces available for it, than any other which would fulfil any of the objects of the defence, for the following reasons:-
The number of good landing places on it is limited.
They are marked on the attached 2* Kap. Their value to the enemy could be- reduced by artificial means, and field defence works could be constructed to stop any force which might succeed in effecting a landing at them.
Although the enemy could, if he were to place his artillery in Kowloon, eventually destroy most of the fixed guns of the defences, he would have much more difficulty in
dealing with the movable guns. These could use concealed positions and move as required.
If the fixed armament were not in action, all the artillery personnel could be used with the movable guns, of which the following could be manned?
60pr guns... 4.5" Howitzers
4.
6
12.
3.7* Howitzers
6
18-pr. guns
28
Such an armament if used according to a carefully worked out plan, would suffice to render the task of landing on the Island very difficult. If it were found that more guns were required, then it should be noted that it has already been ruled that the Washington Treaty does not preclude the bringing of the movable armament up to the following totals:-
60-pr. guns 6" Howitzers. Medium TMs
18-pr. guns
7.
20.
16.
14.
14.
Howitzers.
6
Total
77.
4.5 Howitzers.
3.7
Moreover, if the proposed plan were
adopted,
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